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I. INTRODUCTION 
The failure of the Supreme Court to arrive at a consensus opinion in Fullilove v. 
Klutznick' has continued to create problems in the area of reverse discrimination.2 More 
specifically, the federal courts have had considerable difficulty formulating a consistent 
approach to the issue of the constitutionality of minority participation programs in 
construction contract cases. The difficulties various federal courts have had in analyzing 
these cases are indicative of the shortcomings of the Fullilove decision. First, no agreed 
upon standard of review was put forth in the Fullilove case. Justice Powell adopted the 
traditional strict scrutiny test as the proper standard of review.3 Justice Stevens, Justice 
Rehnquist, and Justice Stewart, while not expressly advocating the strict scrutiny stan-
dard, adopted an equally stringent analysis. Justices Marshall and Brennan suggested an 
intermediate level of scrutiny while Chief Justice Burger forwarded no specific standard 
of review, but rather advocated a more general approach to the issue. Second, the Justices 
focused their opinion solely upon the narrow issue presented in Fullilove. In doing so, 
they failed to provide language which could be used to expand Fullilove's reasoning into 
other programs created by authorities other than Congress itself, which initially legislated 
the program discussed in Fullilove. 
Surprisingly, while a variety of approaches have been used since the Fullilove deci-
sion, the ambiguities presented by Fullilove have not led to a wide disparity of results. Of 
the eight cases analyzed in this note, only one fails to recognize the constitutionality of a 
minority participation program. The similarity of these results would seem to question 
what purpose would be served by studying the federal courts' use of the various Fullilove 
standards. To do so, however, would be too result oriented. This conclusion would 
disregard not only what each of the Fullilove approaches implies constitutionally, but also 
what factors are essential to the proper disposition of a case. Since the Fullilove decision in 
, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
2 The term reverse or benign discrimination describes the use of racial classifications to benefit 
rather than burden particular racial or ethnic minorities. For purposes of this note the term reverse 
discrimination will be used exclusively. 
3 In deciding cases under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the 
Supreme Court has applied the strict scrutiny standard if a state action discriminates against a 
suspect class. So far, the Court has given race, alienage, and ancestry, suspect class status. See Rice, 
The Discriminatory Purpose Standard, 6 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J. I (1986). 
57 
58 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:57 
July 1982, only the eight federal court cases analyzed here have raised the constitutional 
issue of reverse discrimination in a construction situation.4 Each case not only questions 
the constitutionality of certain construction bidding requirements with regard to minority 
participation, but also depends upon the various Fullilove standards.5 
II. FUllILOVE V. KLUTZNICK 
The fundamental issue in the area of reverse discrimination is how to properly 
balance equal protection with the need to remedy past racially-based wrongs. Under the 
Constitution, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits invidi-
ous discrimination by state government, while the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment provides a similar protection against federal actions. 6 If taken at their narrowest 
interpretation, these amendments require that the impact of legislation be color-blind; 
that legislation may not help anyone race. 7 This belief is best exemplified by the statement 
that "[dlistinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very 
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality."8 The theory of reverse discrimination requires a tempering of this idealistic 
statement with the realization that past discrimination has created a situation which must 
be rectified. Thus, the compromise between the narrow constitutional interpretation and 
one which requests a correction of past inequalities results, at least implicitly, in the 
statement that "racial classifications are not per se invalid under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."· 
Fullilove v. Klutznick concerned the constitutionality of the minority business enter-
prise provision (MBE) of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (Act). to This Act 
4 In a recent development, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided on November 25, 1985 
that a city's minority utilization plan was valid under Virginia law and the federal and state 
constitutions. See ].A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 45 Fed. Contracts Rptr. 15 (1985). For a 
discussion of the case, see infra note 149. 
The case of Alaska Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 
1162 (9th Cir. 1982), also dealt with minority involvement in a construction situation. However, this 
case was factually different since the legislation dealt with a preference for Indians. The court based 
its decision on Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), where the Supreme Court had rejected a 
traditional equal protection analysis and used the rational basis test. This status was due to the special 
legal standing of Indian tribes under federal law. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that, 
In summary, legislation preferring Indians is constitutional when applying the rational 
basis test "as long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of 
Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians." Alaska Chapter, 694 F.2d at 1170citing 
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. 
5 On November 6, 1985, the Supreme Court heard the case of Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Education 54 U.S.L.W. 3339 (1985). In this case, the plaintiffs, eight white teachers, stated that their 
layoffs under their collective bargaining agreement was a violation of their equal protection rights 
under the fourteenth amendment. Although this case is factually different from the Fullilove 
situation, the decision by the Supreme Court on this case will obviously have far-reaching effects. 
In an earlier case, the Court held that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not prevent the 
implementation of an affirmative action plan into a private collective bargaining agreement. See 
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 52 U.S.L.W. 4767 (1984). 
6 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 523 (Stewart, ]., dissenting). 
7 Id. 
S Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). 
9 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453 (Burger, C.J., giving the opinion of the Court). 
10 Pub. L. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977), (amending Local Public Works Capital Development and 
Investment Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6701). 
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authorized the Secretary of Commerce to grant funds to state and local governments for 
use in public works projects. I I Under the MBE, at least ten percent of each grant had to be 
for minority businesses. I2 The plaintiffs, consisting of several groups of construction 
contractors and subcontractors, filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plain-
tiffs claimed that the MBE had not only created specific economic injury to their business-
es, but that on its face the MBE was violative of the fourteenth and fifth amendments. 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion, which was joined by Justice White and Justice Powell, 
found the plan to be constitutional. Chief Justice Burger advocated a simple two-step 
approach which did not follow the traditional equal protection analyses used by Justices 
Powell or Marshall. The first step was whether the objectives of the legislation were within 
the powers of Congress. If so, the second step was whether the means employed was 
constitutionally permissible to achieve the remedial goal. 13 
The main emphasis therefore, of Chief Justice Burger's opinion was upon the power 
of Congress to create such legislation. I4 Absent such authority, approaching the second 
step would be unnecessary. As a result, a large portion of his opinion examined the 
legislative history of the MBE program. His purpose in doing so was to establish defini-
tively the purpose behind the Act. At the end of Justice Burger's opinion there remained 
little doubt that Congress perceived the purpose of the MBE to be the correction of past 
racial discrimination. 15 The discussion concerning Congress' actual authority was straight-
forward. I6 Chief Justice Burger stated, "[h]ere we pass, not on a choice made by a single 
judge or a school board, but on a considered decision of the Congress and the Presi-
dent."17 
Having found that Congress possesses the authority to enact race-conscious reme-
dies, the remedy itself must be examined. This inquiry is encompassed in Chief Justice 
Burger's second step, which questions whether the means used was "narrowly tailored to 
achieve [Congress'] objective."18 To determine this, Chief Justice Burger examined a 
number of factors, none of which were dispositive. Of these factors, three are important 
to discuss since they recur in a variety of other opinions. I9 
The first and most crucial factor in the second step is whether the program is 
formulated to right past wrongs. Chief Justice Burger rejected the contention "that in the 
remedial context Congress must act in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion,"20 because the 
II Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453. 
12 Id. at 454. The 1977 Act defined "minority business" as a business owned by at least fifty 
percent minorities or a business where fifty one percent of the stock was owned by minorities. 
Minority group members were defined by the same Act as citizens of the U,S. who were Negroes, 
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. 42 U.S,C, § 103(0(2). 
13 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473. 
I4Id. at 478. 
15 Id. at 467. For a discussion by Chief Justice Burger of the legislative history ofthe 1977 Act, 
see Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453-66. 
16 Chief Justice Burger pointed to the spending power, the commerce clause, and the four-
teenth amendment as possible bases for Congress' actions.ld. at 473-79. 
17 Id. It is not clear how other entities should be analyzed. The implication was that programs 
based on legitimate Congressional authority were quite likely to be found constitutional, while 
programs promulgated by other authorities were to be more closely examined. The opinion, 
however, did not expressly preclude the possible constitutionality of programs created by other 
entities. 
18 Id. at 490. 
19 In addition to these major concerns, Chief Justice Burger also rejected the assertion that the 
MBE program was either underinclusive or overinclusive. The underinclusive argument asserted 
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Fullilove case dealt "not with the limited remedial powers of a federal court ... but with 
the broad remedial power of Congress."~1 Thus, once again Chief Justice Burger de-
ferred to the broad powers of Congress. 
A second factor is the existence of a waiver and exemption provision in the MBE 
program. This factor is significant because the MBE provisions created presumptions 1) 
that past racial discrimination existed, and 2) that at least ten percent of the federal funds 
would be set aside to rectify that situation.~~ Thus, the waiver and exemption provision 
allows these presumptions to be rebutted. A waiver would be granted if good faith efforts 
had been made to achieve the ten percent set-aside.~3 This factor was deemed by Chief 
Justice Burger to be of special "significance."~4 
A third factor responded to the contention that the program was a burden to 
innocent non-minority third parties. Chief Justice Burger rejected this contention in 
Fullilove by asserting that given the overall scope of construction opportunities, "the actual 
'burden' shouldered by non-minority firms is relatively light."~5 As proof, Chief Justice 
Burger relied upon the court of appeal's use of Department of Commerce statistics.~6 
Through this two-step inquiry, Chief Justice Burger implicitly created a standard of 
review which was somewhat less rigid than the one that was to be espoused by Justice 
Powell since it allowed for a more flexible attitude to the criteria by which set-aside 
programs could be judged. Thus, the overall effect of Chief Justice Burger's opinion is 
that it created a favorable climate for MBE programs. 
Justice Powell, while seeing Chief Justice Burger's opinion "as substantially in accord 
with my own views,"~7 nevertheless found that strict scrutiny was the proper standard of 
review. In doing so, Justice Powell differed from Chief Justice Burger in that he placed 
greater emphasis on the need to articulate judicial standards of review in conventional 
terms.~8 
Justice Powell argued that the MBE program should be reviewed under the tradi-
tional strict scrutiny classification since, "immutable characteristics ... are irrelevant to 
that the program was limited to only certain minority groups and was not available to all disadvan-
taged minorities. Id. at 485. With regard to the underinelusive argument, Chief Justice Burger 
reasoned that the purpose of Congress was not to give a preferred status to certain minority groups 
but rather to provide a program which would create equity in a given stiuation.ld. at 485. The 
overinelusive challenge argued that the MBE provisions created benefits for businesses which were 
not specifically affected by identifiable prior discrimination. Id. at 486. To the contention of overin-
elusiveness, Chief Justice Burger replied that "such questions of specific application must await future 
cases." Id. at 486. He reasoned that the challenge presented by plaintiffs in Fullilove did not involve 
any specific challenge to anyone contract, rather it challenged the MBE program per se. Chief 
Justice Burger did state that overinelusiveness still was a consideration and that the MBE program, 
"cannot pass muster unless, ... it provides a reasonable assurance that application of racial or ethnic 
criteria will be limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives of Congress .... " Id. at 487. 
~o Id. at 482. 
~I Id. at 483. 
22 Id. at 487. 
23 Id. at 488. 
24 Id. at 487. 
25 Id. at 484. 
26Id. These statistics showed that in 19774.2 billion dollars in federal grants were conditioned 
upon the MBE provision. This figure was only 2.5 percent of the 170 billion dollars spent on 
construction. Thus, only .25% of the total amount spent on construction, or ten percent of the 4.2 
billion dollars, was accountable to the MBE program. 
27 Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring). 
28 Id. at 495-96. 
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almost every governmental decision."29 Under the strict scrutiny classification, the gov-
ernmental objectives must be accomplished in accordance with a compelling state interest. 
While Justice Powell reflected Chief Justice Burger's view, as well as the opinion of all of 
the other Justices, that racial preference per se was not a compelling state interest, he did 
state that attempts to right past wrongs could be considered such an interest.3o 
To be legitimate under the strict scrutiny test, according to Justice Powell, a remedy 
must comply with three requirements. 31 First, the governmental body must have had the 
authority to create a remedy. Second, actual evidence of the past discrimination must 
have existed. Third, the means selected must have been narrowly drawn to fulfill the 
governmental interest.32 To this third requirement, Justice Powell noted that five factors 
had to be considered in order to find that the means selected were narrowly drawn: 1) the 
efficacy of alternative remedies, 2) the planned duration of the remedy, 3) the relation-
ship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of 
minority group members in the relevant population, 4) the availability of waiver provi-
sions, and 5) the effect of the set-aside upon innocent third parties.33 
Despite the stringency of the test, Justice Powell found that the MBE program was 
constitutional. Like Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell placed a great deal of emphasis 
not only on the fact that Congress had passed the Act, but also that Congress undeniably 
possessed the right to find constitutional violations.34 
The second requirement of Powell's test was satisfied more easily. Relying on the 
extensive legislative history of section 103(f)(2) of the Act contained in Chief Justice 
Burger's opinion, Justice Powell found that "Congress reasonably concluded that private 
and governmental discrimination had contributed to the negligible percentage of public 
contracts awarded minority contractors.,,3;; 
As in Chief Justice Burger's analysis, the finding that the governmental authority 
possessed the power to legislate was the major obstacle. The "means" aspect of the test, 
the third aspect of Justice Powell's test, was easily hurdled, even though it was much more 
specific. The MBE program contained all of the five factors outlined by Justice Powel1.36 
The differences between Justice Powell's and Chief Justice Burger'S opinion seems to 
be one simply of form. Justice Powell's statement that" ... in our quest to achieve a society 
free from racial classification, we cannot ignore the claims of those who still suffer from 
29 I d. at 496. 
30 Id. at 497-98. Justice Powell reasoned that "if the set-aside merely expresses a congressional 
desire to prefer one racial or ethnic group over another, § 103(f)(2) violates the equal protection 
component in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. 
31 Id. at 499. 
32 Id. at 498. 
331d. at 510, 514. Justice Powell found the fifth factor, the effect of the set-aside upon innocent 
third parties, to be "crucial." None of the five, however, were held to be controlling. 
34 Id. at 499. Unlike Chief Justice Burger's opinion, Justice Powell, while granting that Con-
gressional power existed under the commerce clause, placed greater emphasis upon the enforcement 
provisions of the Civil War amendments. Id. at 500. More importantly, Justice Powell opined that the 
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments gave Congress the "unique" Constitutional power 
to legislate with regard to past discrimination. Id. 
35 Id. at 503. Further, Justice Powell noted that, when compared to the exactitude required of 
judicial or administrative adjudication, "Congress may paint with a much broader brush than may 
this Court." Id. at 506 citing Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 284 (1970) (Stewart,J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). 
36 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 514, 515. 
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the effects of identifiable discrimination."37 This statement is applicable to Chief Justice 
Burger's opinion as well. The need for legislative authority to right past discrimination is 
vital to the disposition of both of the decisions. While Justice Powell's opinion does not 
specifically mention "Congress", both he and Chief Justice Burger rely extensively on the 
fact that the legislation was an act of Congress. This emphasis carries with it the expecta-
tion that "the degree of specificity required in the findings of discrimination and the 
breadth of discretion in the choice of remedies may vary with the nature and authority of 
a governmental body."38 Nevertheless, neither Justice considers what discretion another 
governmental body would ~have in formulating remedial programs. 
In addition, both Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger, when contemplating the 
"means" to the legislation, review the same factors. Chief Justice Burger's method, 
however, is merely a rejection of challenges to the MBE program. Justice Powell's strict 
scrutiny test requires the examination of five factors. 
This difference in form is nevertheless crucial. As discussed above, Chief Justice 
Burger's opinion allows for a less formalized approach to the issue of reverse discrimina-
tion. By choosing to not follow traditional equal protection analysis, Chief Justice Burger 
implicitly created an analysis in which minority set-aside programs could be found 
constitutional in a simpler fashion. Conversely, by its very nature, it is much more 
difficult to find that a race-conscious remedy is constitutional under Justice Powell's 
analysis. Strict scrutiny implies a stringent, if not negative, attitude toward the program at 
the outset of the analysis. Though Justice Powell found the MBE program to be constitu-
tional, the need to find a compelling state interest requires an exacting analysis. Justice 
Powell questioned how readily the strict scrutiny test could be applied when taken out of 
the narrow confines of the Fullilove case. If the standard could not be so easily applied, 
then the use of strict scrutiny would create an additional obstacle towards finding such a 
plan constitutional. As Justice Marshall stated in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, "'Strict scrutiny' [is] scrutiny that is strict in theory, but fatal in fact."39 
In Fullilove, Justice Marshall wrote a concurrence joined by Justices Brennan and 
Blackmun. Justice Marshall's main point was that while "racial classifications are prohib-
ited if they are irrelevant,"40 reverse discrimination must be treated differently.41 He 
argued that this leniency should be allowed despite possible disadvantages to whites since 
whites as a class do not possess the "traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not 
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment .... "4" 
Justice Marshall chose, as he did in Bakke, an intermediate level of scrutiny. The 
inquiry should therefore be, "whether racial classifications designed to further remedial 
purposes serve important governmental objectives and are substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives."43 The concurring opinion rejected the more lenient 
37 !d. at 517 (Powell, J., concurring). 
38 [d. at 505 n. 14. 
39 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 365 (1978) (Marshall,]., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
40 [d. at 519 (Marshall,]., concurring) quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Marshall, ]., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). 
41 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 . 
., [d. quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357. 
43 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519. 
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rational basis test because of the concern that certain racial programs stigmatize rather 
than aid a "powerless segment of society."44 
Other than his concern over stigmatization, Justice Marshall's opinion stressed that 
the need to right past wrongs should outweigh the narrow interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment of the Constitution. However, Justice Marshall's viewpoint arguably is 
too forgiving to programs such as the MBE. Justice Powell stated that, "[d]ifferent 
standards of review applied to different sorts of classifications are less likely to be 
legitimate than others."45 If Justice Powell was correct, then racial classifications, benign 
or otherwise, should be placed at a higher level of scrutiny than what Justice Marshall 
advocated. 
The dissent by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist was exemplified by one statement: 
"Under our Constitution, any official action that treats a person differently on account of 
his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect and presumptively invalid."46 The dissent 
opined that Congress must obey the Constitution, and that on its face the MBE program 
was unconstitutional because it was one of racial preference which the Constitution 
prohibited.47 In addition, even if the program were for compensation of a social, eco-
nomic, or educational disadvantage, no race possessed a "monopoly" on these problems.4s 
The dissent either did not consider or did not find relevant the reality of past discrimina-
tion and the need to rectify it. It did not expressly set a standard of review, although, in 
fact, it did apply a criteria as stringent as Justice Powell's. 
Justice Stevens also dissented, but on slightly different grounds. While admitting that 
past discrimination had occurred, he reasoned that a history of discrimination was not 
sufficient reason to ')ustify such a random distribution of benefits on racial lines."49 
Justice Stevens believed "racial characteristics may serve to define a group of persons who 
have suffered a special wrong and who, therefore are entitled to special reparations."5o 
Therefore, the MBE program was fatally flawed, for not only did it fail to prove previous 
incidents where minority businesses were specifically denied access5! but also it did not 
apply to any minority in particular.52 Justice Steven's opinion creates a situation which in 
reality would be too difficult to properly legislate. It requires an unreasonably high 
standard of past discriminatory findings. 
III. UNIVERSITY OF CAUFORNIA V. BAKKE 
Bakke:3 decided in June 1978, was the first Supreme Court case which seriously 
considered the reverse discrimination issue. Most of the opinions given in the Fullilove 
case were first enunciated in Bakke. 
The case arose because Bakke, a white male, failed to gain admittance to the Medical 
School of the University of California at Davis (Davis) in both 1973 and 1974. At that time, 
Davis had two admission programs. The regular admission program, under which every-
44Id. 
45 Id. at 498 (Powell, j., concurring). 
46Id. at 523 (Stewart, j., dissenting) citing Mclaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
47 Id. at 529. 
48 Id. 
49 !d. at 539 (Stevens, j., dissenting). 
50 !d. at 537. 
51 Id. at 539. 
52 Id. at 538. 
53 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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body could apply, summarily rejected any applicant with a grade point average of 2.5 or 
lower on a scale of 4.0.'>4 The special admissions program, operated by a different 
committee, was used to consider "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged" 
applicants.";; Though "disadvantaged" was never defined, no white applicant was accepted 
by the spccial admissions committee."ti Furthermore, the grade point average require-
ment of 2.5 was waived for the special applicants. These candidates were not compared to 
the general admission students. The number of spots reserved for the special applicants 
was dependent upon the class size. In 1973, when the class size was fifty, the prescribed 
number of special admissions was eight. In 1974, when the overall student bo'py was 
doubled to 100, the special admission also doubled to sixteen.;;7 
When Bakke, who applied in both 1973 and 1974 under the general admissions 
program, was rejected in 1974, he filed suit. He claimed that the special admissions 
program discriminated against him in violation of his rights under the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment;'" Article I, section 21 of the California Constitu-
tion;'" and Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.tiO 
The decision of the Supreme Court was split with regard to the two issues presented 
in the case: I) whether the program was illegal and therefore Bakke should be admitted to 
Davis, and 2) whether race could be a consideration in an admissions program. The 
opinions also differed over whether the fourteenth amendment or Title VI was control-
ling. Justice Powell announced the Court's decision. Though his opinion was supported in 
part by all the Justices, it was not completely supported by any of the Justices. 
Justice Powell advocated, as he would later in Fullilove, the strict scrutiny standard. 
Powell stated that "[rJacial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and 
thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."ti' Classifications which touch an 
individual's race or ethnic background must therefore only be allowed if they are pre-
cisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.ti~ Justice Powell based his 
examination upon the fourteenth amendment. Title VI was unimportant to the extent 
that it "must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the 
equal protection clause or the fifth amendment."ti:l 
By stringcntly supporting the equal protection clause, Justice Powell rejected Davis' 
contention that the discrimination could not be suspect if it were "benign."ti4 According to 
.,4 fd. at 273. 
,-).-) fd . at 274. 
. -,1; fd. at 276 . 
. >7 M. at 274 . 
. ,8 fri. at 278. 
.;f) fri. Article 1 § 21 of the California Constitution states, 
No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, 
revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be 
granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all 
CItIzens. (repealed and added to Art. 1, § 7 of the California Constitution). 
nO fd. § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000(d) states, 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tIon under any program or activity receiving federal assistance. 
1;' Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291. 
I;' fd. at 299. 
n:J fri. at 287. 
64 fri. at 294. 
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Justice Powell, to attach such "transitory considerations" to the equal protection clause 
would mean that such classifications "may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces."65 
Having decided on the level of review, Justice Powell then examined the purposes 
behind the special program. Davis claimed that the program provided a substantial state 
interest by: I) reducing the deficit of minorities in the medical profession, 2) countering 
the effects of societal discrimination, 3) increasing the number of physicans who will 
practice in underserviced communities, and 4) obtaining educational benefits derived 
from an ethnically diverse student body.';6 Three of these points were rejected by Justice 
Powell. 
Justice Powell found the first point invalid.67 The second point was too broad in that it 
covered "societal" and not specific discrimination. The authority to cure societal discrimi-
nation was not within the power of Davis.6s The third point was discounted, since no 
evidence existed that Davis' plan was to·aid the underserved community.69 The fourth 
factor, however, Justice Powell found to be within the confines of Davis' academic 
authority.70 The question thus became whether the program's method of creating diver-
sity was necessary.7! 
In response, Justice Powell stated that the assignment of a fixed number was not the 
proper method. 72 Instead, he advocated the Harvard College program in which "race or 
ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' yet not insulate the individual from compari-
son with other candidates."73 
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in part. They also 
found that Davis' special admission program was constitutional, and that race could be 
used as a consideration. 74 First, they claimed that racial classifications made for remedial 
purposes must only serve important governmental objectives, thus creating an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny.7.; Having found that the special program did serve an important 
governmental objective, these Justices then considered whether the special committee 
stigmatized any racial groupS.76 Finding none, they had no problem in finding the plan 
constitutional. 
Justice Stevens, with the Chief Justice, Justice Stewart and Justice Rehnquist,joining, 
concurred in part with Justice Powell's opinion and dissented in part. This opinion, 
however, found the special program illegal under Title VI and not under the equal 
protection clause as Justice Powell had opined. After first stating that "a private action 
may be maintained under Title VI,'>77 Justice Stevens continued by strictly construing the 
legislative history of the act. The opinion relied upon the remarks of Senator Pastore 
made during the debate over passage of Title VI. Pastore said that under Title VI it was 
65 [d. at 298. 
66 /d. at 307. 
67 /d. at 309. 
68 /d. 
69 [d. at 310. 
70 [d. at 312. 
71 /d. at 315. 
72 [d. at 316. 
73 [d. at 317. 
74 [d. at 379 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
75 /d. at 36l. 
76 [d. at 373. 
77 [d. at 419 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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not "permissable to say 'yes' to one person, but 'no' to another, only because ofthe color of 
the skin."78 Thus, Justice Stevens believed that "we are dealing with a distinct statutory 
prohibition" and it "prohibits the exclusion of individuals from federally funded pro-
grams because of race."79 As a result, race, according to these Justices, could not be a 
consideration in an admissions program. 
The result of these opinions is that five Justices found the special program illegal. 
Under the strict scrutiny standard, Justice Powell believed the program was unconstitu-
tional according to the equal protection clause. Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, Stewart, and 
the Chief Justice opined that it was illegal because of Title VI. A different five Justices, 
however, held that race could be considered in the admissions procedures. Along with 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun, Justice Powell again found support 
under the equal protection clause. 
Bakke's effect on Fullilove is obvious. It was with this case that the Justices were able to 
first formulate their opinions concerning reverse discrimination. Later, in Fullilove, they 
clarified those positions. It is therefore important to note the changes and/or develop-
ments that occurred between the two decisions. 
Justice Powell's opinions are consistent. Beyond the obvious fact that both opinions 
advocated strict scrutiny, Justice Powell considered similar principles in both opinions. 
Davis' lack of authority to remedy societal discrimination was in step with Justice Powell's 
test in Fullilove. Only Congress should be given such wide latitude to cure society's 
problems. After examining the source, Justice Powell investigates the means. In Bakke, he 
did not find them defined narrowly enough. Though it is true that Justice Powell did not 
create a "test" in Bakke, the same criteria exist in both cases. 
Justice Brennan's opinions in Bakke and Fullilove also do not differ significantly. 
Interestingly, in Fullilove, Justice White no longer sided with those Justices who ad vocated 
an intelmediate level of scrutiny. He instead agreed with Chief Justice Burger. The 
significance of this shift is that only three of the Justices now support the use of a lesser 
standard in reverse discrimination cases. 
Justice Steven's opinion made the greatest change from Bakke to Fullilove since in 
Bakke the constitutional question was not addressed. Nevertheless, only Chief Justice 
Burger seems to make a fundamental theoretical change in his Fullilove opinion. The rest 
of the Justices remain entrenched in a strict and narrow reading of reverse discrimination 
cases. 
IV. FEDERAL COURT CASES SINCE Fullilove 
The controversial nature of Fullilove and Bakke thus created a variety of viewpoints. 
The cases examined in this note reflect this disparity. All of these cases are similar to 
Fullilove in that they involve the constitutionality of a set-aside program for minorities in 
construction contract situations. At the same time, they are often crucially different in 
that a different legislative or administrative body other than Congress enacted the 
set-aside program. Therefore, the essential issue is often whether the enacting body has 
the authority to right past discriminatory wrongs. These cases can be generally divided 
into three categories. The first category includes three district court cases which apply 
Justice Powell's strict scrutiny test. The second category contains another two cases,80 and 
78 [d. at 41S. 
79 !d. 
80 See infra note 149. 
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they by and large espouse the method suggested by Chief Justice Burger. The third 
category has three cases, one of which has since been vacated on other grounds by the 
Supreme Court. These cases attempt to synthesize the various Fullilove opinions. 
A. The Justice Powell Approach 
The Middle District Court of Alabama in Central Alabama Paving, Inc. v. James 8l was 
the first federal court to apply to a construction bidding case the strict scrutiny standard 
used in Fullilove. The central issue of the case revolved around Department of Transpor-
tation (DOT) regulations adopted in 1980. These regulations required the Alabama 
Highway Department to submit by October 1, 1980 fixed percentage goals for MBE's. If 
the figures were not presented, then Alabama would not receive any federal funding. 
The challenge to the regulation made by Central Paving, a contractor, was twofold. 
First, the original and third party plaintiffs objected to the goals set by the DOT on the 
grounds that it violated the federal competitive bid statute. 82 The second contention was 
that a DOT regulation which stated that if a bidder submits a bid which reaches the MBE 
and Women's Business Enterprise (WBE) levels, then another bid which did not achieve 
those levels, though lower, could not be considered.83 The specific language in question 
stated that if any contractor offered a reasonable price which met the MBE contract "the 
recipient (the State Highway Department) shall [then] presume conclusively that all 
competitors that fail to meet the goal have failed to exert sufficiently reasonable efforts 
and consequently are ineligible to be awarded the contract."84 Thus a presumption was 
created within the rules against those bidders who had failed to achieve the MBE levels. 
In construing the Fullilove opinions, the Alabama district court found the DOT 
regulations to be unconstitutional.85 Though not expressly stated, the approach used was 
clearly the traditional strict scrutiny test. 86 The district court followed the three-step test 
that Justice Powell had followed in Fullilove. It examined first whether the DOT had the 
authority to require a set-aside for minority businesses.87 The court found that it did not. 
Relying on their interpretation of Fullilove, the court stated, 
an administrative agency attempting to impose a race conscious remedy must 
have express Congressional authorization for such actions before those ac-
8t 499 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Ala. 1980). 
82 /d. at 633.23 U.S.C. § 112(b) states that "[c]ontracts for the construction of each project shall 
be awarded only on the basis of the lowest responsive bid sumitted by a bidder meeting established 
criteria of responsibility." 
83 [d. at 632. 
84 [d. citing 45 Fed. Reg. 21,188 (1980). 
85 /d. at 636. 
86 Evidence of the court's preference is seen by the fact that the court first discussed Justice 
Steven's dissent and then Justice Powell's opinion. Finally, it discussed Chief Justice Burger's opinion. 
The court failed to even mention Justice Marshall's concurrence. 
87 [d. at 637. The DOT attempted to claim authority by: 
1. Section 905 of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (45 U.S.C. § 
803); 
2. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et seq.); 
3. Section 30 of the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91-258,84 Stat. 219); 
4. The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302); 
5. Title 23 of the U.S. Code (relating to federal highways); and 
6. The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. § 471 et seq.). 
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tions can be found consistent with the requirements of equal protection. 
Defendants here lack such an express Congressional mandate. BB 
Similarly, the court found that ifthe agency had been given express authorization, at least 
the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test would have to be considered.B9 
The court went on to state that regardless of the first requirement, the DOT also 
failed with respect to the second; the need to expressly show past discrimination.90 The 
DOT, in a prior hearing, had already admitted that no findings of past discrimination in 
relation to highway contracts had been made.91 The failure ofthe agency to pass these two 
requirements sealed the regulation's fate. 
By applying the strict scrutiny test as espoused by Justice Powell, the district court in 
its analysis did not need to reach the details of the DOT regulations. It paid only minimal 
attention to the means aspect of the test: "Furthermore, defendants have made no 
showing that they considered the desirability, appropriateness, or effectiveness of this 
particular program over that of other alternatives."92 
Although Central Alabama properly followed the procedure enunciated by Justice 
.Powell, the court's primary consideration of Congress' power was overemphasized. The 
Supreme Court in Fullilove did not state that no other governmental body could pass 
legislation relating to past discrimination. Indeed, both Justice Powell and Chief Justice 
Burger mentioned the possibility of other governmental bodies authorizing similar pro-
grams, although the opinions did not consider what the standard of review should be.93 
The district court did grant that if administrative agencies could offer sufficent evidence 
of "detailed legislative considerations" or conscious conferral of authority, then it could 
create race conscious remedies. 94 Nevertheless, the court's holding implies that only 
under the most overwhelming evidence would such a grant be allowed. Therefore, the 
opinion of the Central Alabama court narrowly interpreted the Justice Powell approach. It 
did, however, faithfully follow the strict scrutiny test. 
While challenging the result reached in Central Alabama, the case of M.C. West, Inc. v. 
Lewis,9s decided in the Middle District Court of Tennessee, was in many respects a 
decision necessitated by changes made in the DOT regulations subsequent to the Central 
Alabama case. In response to non-minority contractors who strongly criticized the "conclu-
sive presumption" aspect of the DOT regulations,96 the Secretary of Transportation 
amended the regulations on April 27, 1981. The key section within the amended regula-
tion stated that, 
88 Central Alabama, 499 F.Supp. at 637. 
89 !d. at 636. The court pointed to the case of Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
In this case, a Civil Service Commission regulation prohibiting non-U.S. citizens from employment in 
the U.S. Civil Service was found to be unconstitutional. Although the regulation had not been 
enacted by Congress, the delegation of the authority by Congress was much more "explicit" than in 
Central Alabama. 
90 Central Alabama, 499 F.Supp. at 638. 
91 Id. at 632. The hearing was held on September 26, 1980. At the hearing, all parties were 
present. Further, a number of depositions, affidavits, exhibits and briefs were brought into evidence. 
On the basis of the evidence, the preliminary i~unction against the DOT was granted. 
92 [d. at 639. 
93 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 515 n.14 (Powell, j., concurring). 
94 Central Alabama, 499 F. Supp. at 638. 
95 522 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). 
96 Central Alabama, 499 F. Supp. at 632. 
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the recipient shall, in the solicitation, inform competitors that [he] will be 
required to submit MBE participation information to the recipient and that 
the award of the contract will be conditioned upon satisfaction of the re-
quirements ... 97 
69 
The court noted that except for the case at bar, the government believed that with the 
removal of the presumption, challenges to the regulation had all been settled. g8 Plaintiffs 
in this case moved for a preliminary injunction against the amendments to the regula-
tions. 
Like Central Alabama, the district court used Justice Powell's method to find the 
constitutionality of the race conscious remedy. The M.C. West court's use of the strict 
scrutiny test in this case was due to its reliance upon Fullilove and Central Alabama, which 
though not controlling, discussed the same issues and regulations. Therefore, as in Central 
Alabama, the court inM.C. West first had to question whether the agency had the authority 
to promulgate the regulation.99 Though noting that Central Alabama had relied upon 
Congress' sole role as a proper body to create race-conscious remedies, the district court 
contemplated the authority granted to the judicial and executive branches. lOo While 
admitting that the executive" ... is not a law making or an adjudicatory body," the court 
reasoned that" ... it is fairly charged with the duty to fairly execute the laws."lol Despite 
this excursion into the executive branch, the court rejected the government's reliance on 
Executive Order 11,246.102 The court held that this Order should be enforced by the 
Secretary of Labor. No evidence existed, however, that the Secretary possessed any 
express authority over the Secretary of Transportation to promote the Order. 103 The 
court also rejected the government's argument that various statutes granted the DOT 
authority. 104 
The court held that the DOT did possess the power to create the regulation under 
the Small Business Act and Executive Order 11,625.10" Generally, Executive Order 11,625 
empowered the Secretary of Commerce to "coordinate ... the plans, programs and 
operations of the Federal Government which may contribute to the establishment, pres-
ervation, and strengthening of minority business enterprise."lo6 The court applied this 
Order to the Secretary of Transportation by citing the portion of Executive Order 11,625 
which requested that each federal department and agency "continue all current efforts to 
foster and promote minority business enterprises and to support the program, and [to] 
cooperate with the Secretary of Commerce in increasing the total Federal effort."107 
97 M.C. West, 522 F. Supp. at 339 citing 46 C.F.R. § 23461 (l981) (amending 49 C.F.R. § 23.45 
(l980)). 
98 Id. at 339 n.l. 
99 Id. at 343. 
100 Id. 
"" Id. 
"" Id. at 344. The Order stated that a contractor agrees not to "discriminate against any 
employer or applicant ... because of race, color or religion, sex or national origin [and tol take 
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed." 
103 Id. 
104 Id. The lists of acts which the DOT claimed to give them authority was similar to the one used 
by them in Central Alabama, 499 F. Supp. at 637 (see supra note 87). Only the sixth Act, the Federal 
Property and Administrative Service Act of 1949, was omitted. 
10; M.C. West, 522 F. Supp. at 346. 
106 Id. citing Executive Order 11,625 § 1 (a)( 1)( 1971). 
107 M.e. West, 522 F. Supp. at 346 citing Executive Order 11,625 § 3(e) (l971). 
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Support for the Order was further strengthened by the Small Business Act. 108 Within the 
Act the realization of past discrimination was stated, and therefore, according to the 
court, the concerns of the Powell wing were satisfied. 109 Through this analysis, the court 
held that the Small Business Act granted the DOT authority to regulate in this case. 
According to the court, the purpose of the Small Business Act referred to procurement of 
equipment."o However, federal assistance programs such as the MBE's provide services. 
The difference in meaning between the providing of services and a procurement was 
admitted by the court when it stated that the "chain of authority is not pristine."111 
Nevertheless, the court held that "[W]hen the Government exercises its procurement 
function with the purpose of remedying discrimination against minorities it is more like a 
program of federal assistance then pure procurement.,,112 
The court in addressing the second step held that the amended regulations passed 
the "finding of past discrimination" requirement. The court, basing its finding on a factor 
not available in Central Alabama, found evidence of past discrimination on the grounds of 
the comments "received from nearly 400 sources" which caused the amendment to the 
regulations. 113 The court was then swayed by the effects of the "good faith requirement" 
when considering the means test. I 14 The court believed that the good faith remedy in the 
present regulation was so narrow that specific findings were essentially unnecessary. I 15 
The court held in this case that the regulation in question passed the means test; it did not 
create any unnecessary burdens upon non-minority third parties. '16 
Throughout its decision, the court struggled to fit the regulation into the boundaries 
of a strict scrutiny analysis. The M.C. West case best exemplifies the problems which are 
posed by using the strict scrutiny standard of review on reverse discrimination cases. The 
court, presumably swayed by the simplicity and narrowness of the regulation, found that 
it was constitutional. Nevertheless, to do so under the Central Alabama precedent, the 
court had to find a granting authority; an authority not found in Central Alabama. This 
forced the Court to expand its focus into the area of Executive Orders. By doing so, it 
necessarily stretched the intended narrowness of the strict scrutiny test as espoused by 
Justice Powell in Fullilove. The court in essence created a rebuttal to the implied 
negativism of the Justice Powell approach towards such programs. The result of such a 
theoretical expansion was that the coherence of the strict scrutiny test, when faced with a 
different setting, become less well focused and more uncertain. 
The third case to apply the strict scrutiny standard was Michigan Road Builders 
Association, Inc. v. Milliken. 117 Plaintiff brought this case on the contention that P.A. 1980, 
No. 428, M.C.L.A. § 450.77 et seq. (P.A. 428) was facially invalid. P.A. 428 was enacted by 
the Michigan legislature on January 13, 1981. The program, similar in goal to the 
congressionally created Act involved in Fullilove, was an attempt to increase participation 
108 15 U.S.C. § 631 (e)(l)(A)-(G) Id. 
109 Id. 
110 [d. at 347. 
III [d. 
112 Id. 
113 [d. 
114 Id. at 349. 
115 Id. at 348. The court did show concern as to whether or not this remedy would have any 
effect on minority participation. [d. at 348 n.lO. 
116 Id. 
117 571 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Mich. 1983). 
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of minority and women-owned businesses. IIB P.A. 428 established a procurement policy 
which set interim goals for both MBE's and WBE's.119 
The court expressly stated that the standard of review in the case at bar should be 
that of strict scrutiny.l~o The precedence for this conclusion was the Sixth Circuit's 
decision in Bratton v. City of Detroit. I~I The court reasoned that in order to make its 
decision, it had to "examine Fullilove and the appropriate cases of the Sixth Circuit to 
determine the precise meaning of strict scrutiny within the context of legislative enact-
ments which ... favor a minority class."I~~ Through their analysis, the court curiously 
combined the Fullilove opinions of Justices Powell and Marshall by concluding that "[t]his 
Court is persuaded that the opinions of Justices Powell and Marshall are so closely aligned 
to the rule of the Sixth Circuit that this Court should not, and indeed, cannot deviate 
from the law of this Circuit."1~3 The court's conclusion therefore was that by their 
inspection of the Bratton case "the State must demonstrate a significant interest in 
ameliorating the past effects of present discrimination rather than the 'compelling inter-
est' standard ... ;>1"4 
Thus, having decided on a standard of review, the court proceeded with the re-
quirements articulated by the Bratton decision. The court did not need however, to 
examine the first step of the test since the plaintiff did not argue that the Michigan 
legislature was not an appropriate authority to enact race-conscious remedies. The plain-
tiff did contest the second requirement, whether any specific findings of past discrimina-
tion existed, and the court began its analysis at that point. The court first cited Bratton for 
expressing the method by which to uncover specific findings of past discrimination: "the 
discriminatory intent may be established by any evidence which logically supports the 
inference that state action or policies were adopted for invidious purpose."I"" 
The court then held that in this case, "evidence of a prior discrimination need not 
exceed that level which was articulated inBratton."1~6 The court analogized the position of 
the Michigan legislature as the "[ u]ltimate policy making body of the State" with that of 
Congress' position and concluded that the finding by the Michigan legislature need not 
118 [d. at 175 (citing PA 428 § 450.772(2». 
119 [d. For minority owned business, the goal for increasing minority procurement was as 
follows: 
the goal for 1980-1981 shall be 150% of the actual expenditures for 1979-1980; the 
goal for 1981-1982 shall be 200% of the actual expenditures for 1980-1981; the goal for 
1982-1983 shall be 200% of the actual expenditures for 1981-1982, the goal for 
1983-1984 shall be 116% of the actual expenditures for 1982-83, and this level of effort 
at not less than 7% of expenditures shall be maintained thereafter. 
"0 /d. at 176. 
m 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983). In Bratton, the plaintiff, a class of white police sargeants, 
claimed that the adoption of a voluntary affirmative action program by the Detroit Police Depart-
ment violated their rights under Title VI (42 U.S.C. § 2000),42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the fourteenth 
amendment. The Sixth Circuit stated that the proper standard of review was strict scrutiny although 
it also stated that "Justice Marshall's opinion in Fullilove clearly reaffirms the analysis generally relied 
upon in the initial formulation of this Circuit's approach to affirmative action." [d. at 885-86. The 
court did note, however, that the Bratton case addressed a "materially different context" than 
Fullilove. [d. The Fullilove issues were distinct from the employment context of Bratton. 
122 Michigan Road Builders, 571 F. Supp. at 176. 
123 [d. 
124 [d. at 176. 
125 [d. at 178. 
126 [d. 
127 [d. 
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rise to the level required for administrative or judicial bodies. 127 The court then delved 
into the legislative history of P.A. 428 to determine specifically whether the Michigan 
legislature's enactment was actually based on findings of past discrimination. After a 
lengthy exploration into the legislative history of P.A. 428, the court concluded that the 
Michigan legislature's decision was properly based upon evidence which logically inferred 
that racial discrimination existed prior to the enactment. 128 
The court's reliance upon the Bratton precedent led it to create a conglomeration of 
factors for the analysis of the means test. It held that to find the remedy legitimate, it had 
to discover 1) whether any group had been stigmatized by the legislation, and 2) whether 
it had been reasonably drawn. 129 Under the second factor the court cited Fullilove and 
found that the factors which made the MBE constitutionally permissable were: 1) the 
program was strictly remedial, 2) it functioned prospectively, 3) the plan was open only to 
qualified MBEs, 4) technical assistance was to be provided as needed, 5) it provided for a 
waiver, 6) it included an administrative mechanism to prevent unjust participation, and 7) 
the program was appropriately limited in extent and duration. 130 P.A. 428 satisfied each 
one of these considerations and thus the Court held that the legislation was constitution-
ally permissible. 
The analysis of the court in Michigan Road Builders is flawed. Though expressly 
stating the intention to follow the strict scrutiny standard, the court instead created its 
own approach to Fullilove. Its dependence on the opinion of Justice Marshall in Fullilove 
to support strict scrutiny is, at very best, questionable. An intermediate standard requir-
ing an important governmental objective is quite different and less restrictive than a 
standard of strict scrutiny and the need for a compelling state interest. Furthermore, the 
traditional test of strict scrutiny is whether a compelling state interest exists and not 
whether a significant interest exists. In Michigan Road Builders, the court expressly rejected 
the use of a compelling state interest standard. 
The approach to the means aspect of the test is also confusing. The factor of a stigma 
being attached to the program is clearly that of Justice Marshall. 131 In Bakke ,Justice Powell 
rejected stigma as being relevant to an equal protection analysis. 132 The next factor, 
whether it is reasonably created, is of the court's own making and not a criterion used by 
Justice Powell. From the seven factors listed by the Michigan Road Builders court only two 
were espoused by Justice Powell. Three of Justice Powell's factors were ignored. M.C. 
West, while ignoring most of the factors enunciated by Justice Powell, did at least consider 
the crucial fifth factor of the "burden" on third parties. Central Alabama's analysis required 
no such finding, since there, the court held that at the very first step of the test the 
regulation failed. Since the DOT was not an appropriate body to authorize such legisla-
tion, the means did not have to be examined. The other five factors listed in Michigan 
Road Builders also showed the confusion present in the opinion. Nowhere in Fullilove is the 
provision of technical assistance listed as a requirement towards finding the "reasonable-
ness" of the remedy. 
Although it is not expressly necessary for the court to follow Justice Powell's five 
factors, its failure to do so raises two concerns. First, it may be evidence of the court's 
"8Id. at 187. 
1'" Id. citing Bratton, 704 F.2d at 887. 
130 Michigan Road Builders, 571 F. Supp. at 188. 
131 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, j., concurring). 
1" Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294 n. 34. 
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inability to grasp the narrowness of Justice Powell's opinion. Second, it proves that the 
Justice Powell opinion, when placed in a factual situation different than that of Fullilove, is 
extremely difficult to apply. 
The court's difficulty therefore lies in its interpretation ofthe strict scrutiny standard. 
If they did not set such a standard, their analysis, though disjointed, could have been 
more credible yet without precedence. To create a strict standard and to not follow the 
form articulated by Justice Powell leads to a confusing and problematic position. 
These cases present many problems. They do not show any indication that the strict 
scrutiny test as advocated by Justice Powell can be applied to reverse discrimination cases 
in a manner which would make the courts' analyses and decisions simpler to reach. Used 
as precedents, these three cases would not possess much credibility. Parts of the Central 
Alabama holding were simultaneously mooted by the 1981 amendment while the rest were 
challenged and overcome by the M.C. West case. Still, Central Alabama, in spite of its 
narrow analysis was the only case which faithfully articulated the Justice Powell approach. 
The M.C. West decision, in turn, found the program constitutionally valid only after it 
went against the holding of Central Alabama. Furthermore, in its search for a granting 
authority, it went beyond the realm of congressional authority and into the power of the 
executive branch. Finally, Michigan Road Builders, while espousing strict scrutiny, did not 
follow the strict scrutiny standard. 
Beyond the analytical problems in all three cases, the greater problem lies in their use 
of strict scrutiny. It must be remembered that in Fullilove, six Justices of the Supreme 
Court found that an MBE-type program which allowed a ten percent set-aside, in a 
construction bidding situation, was constitutional. Cases with similar fact patterns, which 
depend upon the weight of the Fullilove decision, should also pass constitutional muster. 
Indeed, two of the three cases in this section have found the plan constitutional. A 
standard with the stringency of strict scrutiny presumes at the outset a negative reaction. 
Rebutting the presumption is to invite hazards in analysis. The result is that in spite of 
favorable holdings for such programs, the path of a strict scrutiny test follows creates a 
pall over all MBE programs. 
This argument could be considered too result oriented. Even so, the standard of 
strict scrutiny is still not the best standard of review for reverse discrimination cases. The 
weakness of Justice Powell's opinion is not its philosophical beliefs. The problem is its 
rigidity. It does not allow the various courts to decide cases similar in theory but vitally 
different in reality. This difference is seen in terms of who the authorizing body was that 
enacted the set-aside program. The attempts to create a more flexible standard from the 
Justice Powell approach creates inconsistencies; decisions as stringent as Central Alabama 
or as loosely held as Michigan Road Builders. 
B. The Chief Justice Burger Approach 
The strength of Chief Justice Burger's opinion is that its approach allows for a wide 
variety of factors to be considered. It is not burdened by any traditional method of 
analysis and it does not require the specific following of anyone approach. Indeed, it 
claims that its analysis would fit any of the standards used by the other Justices. 133 While it 
possesses many of the same considerations as Justice Powell's opinion, under Chief Justice 
Burger there is no need to find a compelling state interest. 
133 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492 (Burger, C.J., opinion). 
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The case of Ohio Contractors Association v. Kreip134 did not expressly state any particular 
standard of review. The court followed general guidelines similar to the approach used by 
Chief Justice Burger. Further, by not explicitly following the standard adopted by Justice 
Powell, the court fell under the implied standard expressed by Chief Justice Burger. 
The case arose due to the Ohio General Assembly's passing of an MBE act in 
November 1980. The contested provision of the act required the director of the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services to find "a number of [state construction] contracts whose 
aggregate value is approximately five percent of the total estimated value ofthe contracts" 
and set aside that total for minority businesses only. 135 Further, approximately fifteen 
percent of the estimated total value of all state contracts for purchases of equipment or 
supplies were to De set aside for minority businesses. 136 
The Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and held that the plan 
was constitutional. The Sixth Circuit in reaching this decision did not expressly chart what 
factors it had to consider. Rather the court first examined whether specific findings of 
past discrimination had been made by the Ohio legislature. While noting that none of the 
concurringJustices in Fullilove would have declined to acknowledge the importance of the 
need for findings, the court held that the district court was "too restrictive" in its 
approach. 137 The district court had held that since the preamble to the program did not 
expressly recite any purpose of the legislature to identify and correct past racial wrongs, 
then the legislature had no right to authorize the program. The Sixth Circuit, taking 
instead Chief Justice Burger's approach, found that the "backdrop" of the legislative 
history of the provision and the floor debate regarding the proposals, made it clear that 
the purpose of the legislation was the correction of past racial wrongs. 138 
The court had a more difficult time finding the Ohio legislature an appropriate 
authority. It first recounted its interpretation of Justice Powell's use of the word "unique" 
when describing Congress' role. The court stated, "we believe he Uustice Powell] meant 
the power [of Congress] was 'notable' or 'unequaled', not 'sole' or 'exclusive'."'39 It then 
noted examples of other public bodies which had enforced provisions such as school 
desegregation and the Detroit Board of Police Commission. 140 The court then compared 
the power granted to Congress by the fifth amendment to enact such legislation with the 
fourteenth amendment's ability to do the same to the state government. '4' 
In examining the means aspect of the case, the court found that it passed muster. It 
chose the four factors used by the district court: I) the lack of a durationallimitation, 2) 
the creation of an undue burden, 3) the possibility of unjust participation, and 4) the 
availability of a less intrusive means. l4" 
The issue of durational limitations was of the most interest. The district court had 
found the lack of a sunset provision to be fatal. 143 The Sixth Circuit found that the "Ohio 
134 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983). 
135 [d. at 169 citing Ohio Revised Code § 125-081(A). 
136 [d. 
137 [d. at 170. 
138 /d. 
139 /d. at 172. 
140 [d. The court cited the Supreme Court holding in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 
U.S. 144 (1977) to prove the former, while pointing to its own case of Detroit Police Officers v. 
Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981), as evidence of the latter. 
141 Kreip, 713 F.2d at 172. 
14" [d. at 173-74. 
143 /d. at 175. Chief Justice Burger also discussed the limited duration period of the MBE in 
Fullilove. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 489. 
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act is subject to continuing reassessment and reevaluation. The record discloses that in 
1981, the General Assembly passed legislation ... clarifying the ... requirement and 
adding operational details to the waiver provision."144 Thus, the court held that "so long 
as the necessity for reassessment and reevaluation of a race-conscious remedial measure is 
recognized," the act did not need an ending date. 145 
Judge Engel dissented to the opinion. 146 The dissent, which agreed with district 
court, was based on the narrow grounds that the Ohio MBE act failed to provide any 
durationallimits. 147 Although not stating any standard of review, Judge Engel opined that 
in its present form the act presented, "a very real danger of fostering a dependancy upon 
favoritism which is inimical to general policies of equality."14s 
This case is an example of the importance of form in finding the constitutionality of a 
program. The court evidently did not wish to place reverse discrimination under strict 
scrutiny standards. This was proven by the court's belief that the district court's approach 
was too stringent. Chief Justice Burger's opinion provided the court a level of judicial 
scrutiny which was theoretically below the strict scrutiny level, but still substantially above 
the intermediate level of review. Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger's opinion gave the 
court the ability to analyze the factors posed by the district court and to reject their 
holdings. Thus, the court did not have the burden of rebutting the implicit presumption 
that existed in the strict scrutiny standard. A formal test would not have allowed for a 
proper discussion of another court's opposing viewpoint. 
The one case which did expressly attempt to parallel its analysis with that of Chief 
Justice Burger's was South Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. 
v. Metropolitan Dade County, Florida. 149 The Dade County ordinance and resolution con-
tested in this case arose from the Dade County Commission's action on findings of the 
1980 Liberty City disturbances. 150 The studies showed that race relations would worsen if 
business opportunities in the black community did not improve. 151 As a result the Com-
mission on July 20, 1982 passed Ordinance 82-67, which was designed to foster black 
economic growth.I"~ The regulations under the Ordinance stated "Black subcontractor 
goals are to be based on the greatest potential for Black subcontractor participation and 
144 [d. 
145 [d. 
146 /d. at 176 (Engel, j., dissenting). 
147 [d. 
148 Id. 
149 723 F.2d 846 (lIth Cir. 1984) eert. denied _ U.S. _, 105 S.Ct. 220, 83 L.Ed.2d. 150 (l984). In 
the recent case of J .A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 45 Fed. Contracts Rptr. 15 (1985), the j.A. 
Croson Co. challenged the Minority Business Utilization Plan of the City of Richmond. The court 
followed the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Dade County and found the plan constitutional. The 
court called the Eleventh Circuit's factors a "synthesis" of the Fullilove opinions despite that court's 
labelling the approach as similar to Chief Justice Burger's opinion. 
150 Eight reasons were given in the Report of the Governor's Dade County Citizens Committee 
for the black community's civil disturbances in Liberty City. The reasons were: 
(l)poverty, unemployment and underemployment; (2) slum housing and living condi-
tions; (3) functional illiteracy; (4) the perception among Blacks of the local criminal 
justice system; (5) inadequate youth recreational facilities and activities; (6) political 
deprivation; (7) hard core juvenile delinquency; and (8) the general failures of society, 
quoted in Dade County, 552 F. Supp. at 915. 
1.'1 Dade County, 723 F.2d at 848. 
15; [d. 
76 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:57 
shall relate to the potential availability of Black-owned firms in the required field of 
expertise."153 The Dade County Commission found the Earlington Heights station, which 
was part of a billion dollar rapid transit system, to be suqject to the Ordinance. The 
Commission held that competitive bidding would be limited solely to the black popula-
tion. As a result, the Commission passed Resolution No. R-1350-82(R-1350), which 
enacted a 100% set-aside for the bidding for the contract and a fifty percent goal for the 
subcontracting work. 154 
After reviewing the various opinions of Bakke and Fullilove, the Eleventh Circuit 
relied on what it considered to be the "common concerns" of the Justices: I) that the 
governmental body had the authority to pass such legislation; 2) that adequate findings 
had been made; and 3) that the remedy was narrowly tailored to fit the objectives. 155 In 
doing so, the court stated that, "This approach is most closely akin to that set out in Chief 
Justice Burger's opinion in Fullilove ."156 The court approved of the importance of balanc-
ing the need to right past wrongs against the harm to third parties but it rejected the use 
of a formal "test". 157 
The court relied on the Kreip reasoning to reject the "unique" role of Congress in 
determining the credibility of the Commission. 15B More specifically, it found authority in 
the Home Rule Charter which expressly gave the county power to waive competitive 
bidding. 159 Furthermore, the court found that Dade County had made adequate findings 
of past discrimination. The court relied on the various findings made by the district court 
of the Commission's use of certain studies in enacting its Ordinance. 160 
The means part of the analysis was also easily dispensed with. In evaluating the Dade 
County Ordinance the court reasoned that the three tiers of administrative review that a 
set-aside project had to pass were sufficient to prevent unjust participation and "undue 
burden" on third parties. 161 In addition, the periodic review and assessment of the 
program was found to provide a competent complement to the three-tiered review. 162 
The essential issue of this case and the difference between it and the other cases was 
that the court, after finding the Ordinance constitutional, had to find whether the 
program, R-1350 in particular, was constitutionally applied. In finding that the project 
was constitutionally acceptable, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court's holding. 
The lowe'r court had stated that a 100% set-aside on the station created an unfair burden 
on third parties. 163 The district court then held that the fifty percent figure was a goal, not 
a set-aside, and therefore was constitutionally acceptable. 164 
The circuit court found the lower court's distinction between the fifty percent goal 
and the set-aside questionable. 16s In essence, the court saw no significant difference. As 
153 !d. 
154 ld. at 849. 
1" ld. at 851. 
156 !d. at 852. 
157 ld. 
158 ld. 
159 !d. citing Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, Home Rule Charter § 4.03(D) (as amended 
through Oct. 5, 1978). 
160 Dade County, 723 F.2d at 853 (citing findings made by the district court. 552 F. Supp. at 917). 
161 Dade County, 723 F.2d at 853. 
16' ld. 
163 Dade County, 552 F. Supp. at 941. 
1641d. 
165 Dade County, 723 F.2d at 856. 
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long as the set-asides were narrowly tailored to the Ordinance, the remedy would pass 
scrutiny.166 More importantly, the court ruled that the totality of the project, not just the 
Earlington Heights section, had to be considered. H;7 Under this consideration, the Ear-
lington Heights project constituted less than one percent of the total cost of the project. 168 
Taking that percentage and relating it to the fact that seventeen percent of the population 
of Dade County was black, the court held, "the effect of the set-aside and the subcontrac-
tor goal is not disproportionate."16~ 
This case produced no major analytical problems. The court simply considered the 
factors Chief Justice Burger found relevant and applied them. The court's decision 
reflected Chief Justice Burger's underlying theme that in reaching a decision on race-
conscious remedies, a balancing of factors must occur. A balance must occur between the 
remedy and the harm done to third parties. The court did this with their consideration of 
the Earlington Heights project. Nevertheless, like Chief Justice Burger's opinion in 
Fullilove, once the Eleventh Circuit stated its approach, its holding was hardly surprising. 
A more interesting aspect of Dade County is the possibility that even using the most 
stringent and narrow opinion of Fullilove, this Ordinance probably would have been 
found to be constitutional. Justice Stevens' dissent in Fullilove centered mostly on the fact 
that the remedy of an MBE program was not sufficiently specific. In Dade County, the 
Ordinance was a direct result of a specific occurrence which exemplified past discrimina-
tion. The remedy was not general. It applied only to blacks and not to any other minority 
group. Given the narrowness of this remedy, the surprising aspect of the case is that the 
lower court, even though it applied the strict scrutiny standard, found the Ordinance 
unconstitutional. 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion while not stating an exact standard of review, does 
create an implied one. These construction cases reflect this implied standard that race-
conscious remedies should not be considered as stringently as they would be under strict 
scrutiny, but somewhere definitely above the standards required by Justice Marshall. The 
lack of an express standard of review allowed the courts to bring in considerations 
relevant to their particular cases. The analysis of both the Kreip and Dade County cases do 
not produce the complicated and confused reasoning evident in Michigan Road Builders or 
M.C. West. It would seem that Chief Justice Burger's opinion allows for a simpler if not 
more logical method of analyzing reverse discrimination in construction bidding situa-
tions. 
The only possible drawback is that Chief Justice Burger's position fails to give 
sufficient guidance to the lower courts. It is important that courts remain within the 
guidelines imposed by his opinion. To not follow Chief Justice Burger's approach, or the 
tests required by Justices Powell or Marshall is to skirt the constitutional issue. This in 
essence is what the next three cases reflect. 
C. The Synthesis Approach 
The courts in the following cases expressly state that they need not enter the 
analytical labyrinth created by Fullilove. Instead, they combine the common concerns of 
all of the opinions of Fullilove. By doing so, these courts commonly believe that their 
166 [d. 
167 [d. at 855. 
168 [d. 
169 [d. 
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analysis would be applicable under any of the standards of review used in Fullilove. This 
viewpoint differs, however, from Chief Justice Burger's similar statement in Fullilove. 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion at least implicitly created a level of scrutiny even if it 
pursued a path independent from other Justices. The cases analyzed here attempt only to 
synthesize the Justices' opinions from Bakke and Fullilove. This approach is one which 
appears to be taking on increasing popularity, despite its lack of a theoretical foundation. 
The first attempt to use the synthesis approach was in the case ofPettinaro Construction 
Company, Inc. v. Delaware Autlwrity for Regional Transit .170 Plaintiffs in this case contested 
provisions set forth by the Delaware Authority for Regional Transportation (DART). 
DART was established as a local transportation authority by an act of the state legislature. 
On June 4, 1975, DART, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
solicited bids for the construction of an operations center. Originally, the project manual, 
which contained in Paragraph 16, the bidding specifications for the project, stated the 
requirement that a contractor "use its best efforts" in seeking minority business subcon-
tracting work. 171 This phrase was later changed to require that fifteen percent of the 
subcontracts had to go to minority business enterprises. 172 Pettinaro Construction Co., the 
plaintiff, though turning in the lowest bid, failed to achieve the fifteen percent figure. 173 
The contract was therefore given to Ehret of Delaware, Inc., the lowest bidder who had 
complied with the percentage requirement. While claiming that it had made a good faith 
effort to comply with Paragraph 16, Pettinaro contended that the stipulation was not 
justified by any compelling state interest. 
The opinion of the court stated that both parties in their arguments had "synthe-
sized" the Bakke and Fullilove decisions and concluded that to pass constitutional muster 
the court had to find that: I) the program was supported by a finding by a competent 
legislative body that unlawful discrimination against minority businesses had occurred, 
and 2) that the remedy was narrowly drawn. 174 The court then noted that the motion to be 
decided was one for summary judgment by the plaintiff, and therefore a heavy burden 
was to be placed upon them. 175 Because of the limited nature of a summary judgment 
motion, the court held that it needed only to find questions of material fact. 176 If it did 
find factual disputes then, "it must leave resolution of these issues to another day and 
deny the moving party's motion for summary relief."177 The important constitutional 
issue created an additional burden on the plaintiff178 and made the court's examination of 
the motion "particularly exacting.,,179 For the court to grant Pettinaro's motion, the court 
held that there must have been "undisputed evidence that the racial preference imposed 
in this case was not supported by a legitimate finding of prior discrimination by a 
competent body and was not designed to redress the present effects of this past discrimi-
nation."180 
170 500 F. Supp. 559 (D. Del. 1980). 
171 [d. at 560 (citing Docket Item 32, p.3, paragraph 16). 
172 !d. at 561. 
173 [d. at 562. 
174 [d. 
175 [d. at 563 (citing FED. R. elv. P. 56c). 
176 [d. at 563. 
177 [d. 
178 [d. 
179 [d. 
180 [d. at 564. 
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On the basis of the two requirements and in consideration of the motion, the court 
held that summary judgement had to be denied. It based its-decision on the "stringent 
standards," and against the "backdrop of complex constitutional issues, provided by Bakke 
and Fullilove."181 
In its decision, the court took under examination the challenges put forth by the 
plaintiff. First, the plaintiff contended that no findings of past discrimination had been 
made. 182 Second, Pettinaro claimed that none of the offices of the federal or state 
government was vested with the proper authority.183 In either instance, the court found 
that these claims were not factually supported.184 In addition, the fact that the defendant 
disputed the claims was sufficient to deny summary judgment. The court concluded by 
stating, "the court must be assured of an adequate factual record, and cannot rest a 
decision granting summary relief on the basis of bald assertions unsupported by any 
cogent factual predicate."185 
The analysis used in this case is not that useful when investigating the constitutional 
issue because the court's concern for the summary judgement motion substantially 
changes the court's constitutional analysis. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the 
court's use of the term "stringent standards" was not evidence of the court's adoption of 
the Justice Powell opinion. The phrase was used in the opinion more as a descriptive 
phase rather than a term of art. The court did not require and did not follow any of the 
tests for strict scrutiny. Instead the court simply synthesized the factors from Justice 
Powell's and Chief Justice Burger's opinions and generally investigated the objectives and 
the means of the legislation. 
The West Michigan Broadcasting Company v. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
case186 arose from an FCC plan to do a comparative evaluation of two construction permit 
applications to establish a new FM. radio station in Hart, Michigan. The comparative 
evaluation process of the FCC, through which the two applications were processed, 
contained six considerations. 187 Considerations of the factors resulted in high marks for 
both West Michigan, the eventual plaintiff, and Waters Broadcasting Corporation. Due to 
this equality, the FCC was forced to consider the particular attributes of the owners of 
each applicant. These attributes contained two factors: I) the integration of local own-
ership with management, and 2) the integration of minority ownership with manage-
ment. 188 For the first factor, West Michigan received "substantial enhancement"189 to its 
181 [d. 
182 [d. 
183 [d. at 565. 
184 [d. 
185 /d. 
186 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
187 [d. at 604. These are: 
1. Diversification of control of the media of mass communication; 
2. Full-time participation in station operation by owners; 
3. Proposed program service; 
4. Past broadcast record; 
5. Efficient use of frequency; 
6. Character. 
These considerations evolved from the FCC's use in 1965 of its Policy Statement on Broadcast 
Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965). 
188 [d. at 606. 
189 [d. 
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application because of the owner's local residence and community involvement. Waters, 
however, was only given a "moderate enhancement" in the same category.190 For the 
second factor, Waters, a minority owned company, received a "substantial enhancement" 
and was awarded the permit. 191 West Michigan challenged the FCC's award of the grant to 
Waters. 
In discussing this factor on constitutional grounds, the court found the plan legal. 192 
The court only considered what it found to be the highlights of the Bakke and Fullilove 
opinions. It also expressly stated that the FCC plan did not need to enter the various paths 
of the opinions of the Supreme Court. 193 The two major considerations which the court 
discussed in finding the program constitutional were: I) the fact that the minority consid-
eration was only one of the many criteria, and 2) Congress' approval of the FCC plan. 194 
To support the use of the first consideration, the court pointed to the similar factor in 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. 195 The court held that "clearly, under Justice Powell's 
approach the FCC's goal of bringing minority perspectives ... could legitimize the use of 
race as a factor in evaluating permit applicants.,,196 The court analogized the FCC plan 
withJustice Powell's support ofthe idea that "race or ethnic background may be deemed a 
'plus' in a particular applicant's file."197 
The second consideration was even more easily supported. The court noted that 
Congress had explicitly mandated that the FCC follow a minority promotion program. 198 
Given this congressional approval, the court then discussed the importance of con-
gressional authority in the decisions in Fullilove. 199 The court further noted that Congress 
had explicitly found evidence of "severe underrepresentation in the media of mass 
communications."2oo With these similarities the court concluded that "an administrative 
agency [such as the FCC] can certainly follow Congress' lead in an effort to further 
implement Congress' concerns."201 
The Ninth Circuit in Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School District202 discussed the constitu-
tional issue involved in reverse discrimination. However, the Supreme Court vacated the 
Ninth Circuit's decision on June 21, 1982.203 Nevertheless, it is at least academically 
interesting to examine how the Ninth Circuit tackled the constitutional issue by using the 
synthesis approach. In Schmidt, the policy being challenged was the affirmative action plan 
(AAP) adopted by the Oakland Unified School District (District). This program was 
190 [d. 
191 [d. 
192 [d. at 613. The plaintiff also raised non-constitutional arguments based on the FCC's prior 
policy towards minority ownership, on the FCC's treatment of Water's owner's residence and on the 
contention that Hart, Michigan had an unsubstantial black population. See id. at 608-12. 
193 [d. at 613. 
194/d. at 614-15. 
195 [d. at 614. 
196 [d. 
197 [d. at 615 citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18. 
198 [d. at 612. 
199 [d. at 615. 
200 [d. at 616. 
201 [d. 
202 662 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1981) vacated on other grounds Schmidt, 457 U.S. 594 (1982). 
203 In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court had overstepped its 
bounds by ignoring the state-law question. The Court held that "[ilf the affirmative action plan is 
invalid under state law, the Court of Appeals need not have reached the federal constitutional issue." 
[d. at 595. Thus, the Court vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit's decision. 
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applied to construction contracts solicited by the District. The District was required under 
the California Educational Code to award to "the lowest responsible bidder" any contract 
for work over $12,000.204 The District defined a "responsible bidder" in construction 
contracts over $100,000 to be one who must use minority owned businesses for at least 
twenty five percent of the dollar amount of the total bid.205 
In 1977, the plaintiff submitted a bid for the refurbishing of the Oak Grove Campus 
of Oakland Technical High School. The plaintiff, a white controlled company, submitted 
the lowest bid. Under this bid, sixteen percent of the work was to go to Jot Brown, Inc., a 
minority owned business. Since the plaintiff did not fulfill the twenty five percent re-
quirement, the contract was taken from it and was given to the next lowest, AAP qualified 
bidder. Summary judgment was granted to the defendants in the lower court. 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's decision.206 While expressly reject-
ing any need to find any applicable standard,207 the court still followed the three basic 
considerations used by both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell in Fullilove. First, the 
court discussed the plaintiff's contention that the District did not have an important 
interest in remedying these discriminatory effects.208 Furthermore, the District, according 
to the plaintiff, did not have the authority to remedy these effects.209 
The court's response was twofold. It first noted that the effect of the AAP was 
focused to remedy the discriminatory impact of one specific industry.210 The program was 
not a shotgun approach towards healing a societal problem, an approach which was 
clearly rejected by Justice Powell in Bakke. 211 The court then held that the District and its 
executive arm, the School Board, were the perfect bodies to "assert an interest in 
remedying the effects of past discrimination in this particular industry."212 The court 
found that if the District were to perpetuate discriminatory actions within its own con-
struction contracts, it would "seriously undermine it credibility in the community ... 
thereby impairing its capacity to educate."213 Thus, the District's authority was sufficient 
to create the AAP. 
The second step was seen as the most important. The court held that specific findings 
of past discrimination had to be proven. To do so, the court pointed not only to a variety 
of meetings which had been held to implement more minority participation, but also to 
statistical evidence that many residents in Oakland were underrepresented in the con-
struction field. 214 Furthermore, the court pointed out that the School Board had ample 
expertise in evaluating school construction bids and was therefore a competent body to 
make such findings.~15 
204 Schmidt, 662 F.2d at 553 citing California Educational Code § 39640. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 555. 
207 Id, at 557. 
208 Id. at 558. The use ofthe term is used either incorrectly or generically. From Justice Powell's 
viewpoint, the state should have a compelling state interest before a program can pass such scrutiny. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309. 
212 Schmidt, 662 F.2d at 559. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. The court, citing Superintendent Love, stated that from 1947 to 1975, the year the AAP 
was adopted, 135 construction contracts were awarded over the $100,000 amount. Only one was 
awarded to a minority contractor. 
215 Id. 
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Having considered the authority of the District, the court then approached the 
means aspect of the AAP. The court considered three factors of the program most 
pertinent. With each, they found support for it within the opinions of Bakke and Fullilove. 
The fact that the program applied only to those meeting a minimum standard was 
supported by the Bakke decision.216 In Bakke, Justice Brennan's opinion stated "approv-
ingly" that the percentages adopted by Davis did not exceed the percentage of minorities 
in the California population.217 Similarly, the twenty five percent figure used in the AAP 
was not too high when compared to the fact that as of July I, 1970, 34.5% of the 
population in Oakland were non-white.218 The AAP not only considered race as one of 
many factors in the entire bidding process as suggested by Justice Powell in Bakke,219 but 
also possessed a waiver provision as stressed by Chief Justice Burger in Fullilove. 22o With 
the examination of these factors, and with the judicial support of Bakke and Fullilove, for 
these considerations, the plan was clearly found to be constitutional. 
The importance of this case is not in its constitutional analysis. The court's holding is 
merely a potpourri of the different emphases of the Justices' opinions in Bakke and 
Fullilove placed within the three considerations advocated by both Justice Powell and 
Chief Justice Burger in those cases. The relevance of the case is that it was an example of 
how most reverse discrimination plans in construction contract cases may pass constitu-
tional muster given facts similar to Fullilove. Although the court recognized the im portant 
differences of a School Board and Congress, the Ninth Circuit fully appreciated its factual 
similarity to Fullilove.221 Still, this result oriented approach cannot be taken too far. It is 
still essential for the courts to analyze the cases within the framework of Fullilove and not 
to simply depend on similar fact patterns. 
The synthesis approach takes the important considerations of Bakke and Fullilove that 
best apply to the particular case. This approach arguably is the proper one in examining 
reverse discrimination. The rationale behind such an argument would state that since no 
one standard of review has been decided, then the best method of judging the constitu-
tionality of an MBE-type program is to discern only the major strands of the Justices' 
opinions in Bakke and Fullilove. 
The weakness of this argument is directly found in its supposed strengh; its synthesiz-
ing of opinions. By only taking parts of the various opinions of Bakke and Fullilove, the 
logic of each opinion in those Supreme Court cases becomes essentially irrelevant. Admit-
tedly no consensus arose from either Bakke or Fullilove. But by only using highlights of the 
opinions, any particular standard of review espoused by a Justice is lost. As a result, the 
synthesis approach does not fall under any of the constitutional standards but rather 
avoids using any standard at all. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Only one of the eight federal cases which have been decided since the Fullilove 
decision has found an MBE-type program in the area of construction bidding to be 
unconstitutional. While this fact has little or no bearing upon the constitutional analysis of 
216 !d. 
217 Id. citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 324. 
218 Schmidt, 662 F.2d at 559. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 560. 
221 Id. 
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these cases, it is an important statistic. What the figure strongly suggests is that minority 
set-aside programs in construction contract situations stand a good chance of being found 
constitutional regardless of what standard is used. 
However, after this study of construction set-aside cases, it is obvious that issues must 
be resolved by the Supreme Court. First, a clarification of the Court's stance as to reverse 
discrimination needs to be accomplished. Second, how this standard is to apply to 
authorities not explicitly administered by Congress, would hopefully be answered. 
A federal court dependent today on the eight cases analyzed here could be confused 
as to what standard of review to use. Three of the cases, Central Alabama, M.C. West, and 
Michigan Road Builders, adopted the strict scrutiny test. Another two, Kreip, and Dade 
County, utilized Chief Justice Burger's approach which results in a less stringent standard. 
Three cases, Pettinaro, West Michigan, and Schmidt totally avoided the constitutional issue, 
while none of the cases advocated Justice Marshall's intermediate level of scrutiny. 
Justice Powell's test is hurt by the analytical problems in bothM.C. West and Michigan 
Road Builders. Only Central Alabama, whose authority has since been narrowed and muted, 
adheres to Justice Powell's test. 
The strength of Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Fullilove exists because of the 
applicability of his opinion to a variety of factually different cases. While at least implicitly 
creating a standard of review, Chief Justice Burger's opinion was broad enough to allow 
for a fair amount of latitude in interpretation. As a result, courts cannot only apply it to 
differing factual patterns but can consider special factors relevant to their case. Thus, the 
strength of Chief Justice Burger's method is that none of the cases which employ it, 
possess any anlytical faults. 
Justice Powell's opinion suffers from this lack of applicability. It is not the stringency 
of his philosophical views which restrict Justice Powell's test. Indeed, the considerations of 
congressional authority and the need to find actual evidence of past discrimination are 
similar to Chief Justice Burger's criteria. Rather the problem results from a combination 
of how the federal courts have attempted to apply the strict scrutiny standard to the cases 
and the inherent presumption that seems to exist in this standard against affirmative 
action programs. 
Thus, Chief Justice Burger's approach as articulated in Fullilove seems to be the most 
workable. It properly balances the recognition of the historical lack of minority participa-
tion in the construction bidding process against the realization that racial classifications, 
benign or otherwise, must be carefully scrutinized. 
An-Ping Hsieh 
